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I. INTRODUCTION
Because mass torts' are often multistate,' they generate conflict of laws
questions3 that current choice of law doctrine does not resolve equitably
and efficiently." The Supreme Court's decision in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
1. In this Note, the term "mass tort" refers to single-incident, multiple-victim accidents such as
airplane, bus, or train crashes, see, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at Washington, D.C. on January
13, 1982, 559 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1983) [hereinafter Washington, D.C. Air Crash], structural
failures, see, e.g., In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982), or non-recurring mass
exposures to toxic chemicals where the causal connection between the toxins released and harm is
clear, see, e.g., In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984, 634 F.
Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) [hereinafter Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal].
Some mass disasters do not neatly fit into any of these categories. Consider, for example, the asbes-
tos and Dalkon Shield claims that arose from exposure to or use of dangerous or defective products
over many years in different parts of the country. Such accidents lack a fixed time and space fact
pattern common to all claimants and thus may require alternate compensation systems for the efficient
and fair resolution of the damage claims they generate. See, e.g., Elliot, Goal Analysis Versus Institu-
tional Analysis of Toxic Compensation Systems, 73 GEo. L. REv. 1357, 1369 (1985) (not all toxic
torts fit "pattern required by civil cases for damages in court"). This Note addresses mass torts in
which the causal relationship between incident and injury is sufficiently clear to permit their fair and
efficient resolution in civil courts.
2. Mass torts can be "multistate" in two senses: They may injure people domiciled in different
states; they may also generate claims for personal injury and wrongful death in more than one state.
3. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir.
1981) [hereinafter Chicago Air Crash] (conflicts questions concerning punitive damages in wrongful
death actions); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) [herein-
after Agent Orange] (conflicts questions concerning liability, government contract defense, and puni-
tive damages); Washington, D.C. Air Crash, 559 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1983) (conflicts questions
concerning products liability and punitive damages); In re Air Crash Disaster at Boston, Mass. on
July 31, 1973, 399 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Mass. 1975) [hereinafter Boston Air Crash] (conflicts questions
concerning amount recoverable for wrongful death); In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F.
Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975) [hereinafter Paris Air Crash] (conflicts questions concerning type and
measure of damages for wrongful death).
4. See infra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
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Electric Manufacturing Co.5 requires a federal court sitting in diversity
to apply the choice of law rule of the state in which it sits.6 Thus, a
federal court presiding over multidistrict mass tort litigation must first dis-
cover and then apply numerous and varying state choice of law rules. As a
result, different substantive laws frequently govern the identical claims of
parties injured in the same mass accident, simply because they reside in
different states.' This Note argues that Klaxon should not apply in mass
tort litigation.8
The federal courts need more than freedom from state choice of law
rules,9 however, if they are to adjudicate fairly and efficiently claims aris-
ing from mass torts in a modern technological society. The federal courts
also require a set of guiding choice of law principles that the Supreme
Court, because of its infrequent and circumscribed 0 review of choice of
5. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
6. In Klaxon, the Court held that where a federal court's jurisdiction over an action brought in
Delaware for breach of contract was based on diversity of citizenship, the court was not free to deter-
mine the applicability of a New York interest statute in accordance with its own conception of the
better view of the law but was bound to follow the conflict of laws rules prevailing in Delaware's state
courts. The Court rested its decision on the Erie doctrine, saying, "Otherwise, the accident of diversity
of citizenship would constantly disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate state and federal
courts sitting side by side." 313 U.S. at 496 (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)); see
also Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975) (per curiam) (reaffirming Klaxon).
7. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
8. Klaxon has been widely criticized on the grounds that the decision was not required by the
Constitution or the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982), and represents an unwarranted
extension of Erie into the area of choice of law. See R. BRIDWELL & R. WHIrTEN, THE CONsTrrTU-
TION AND THE COMMON LAW 135 (1977); E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 112 (1982);
C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 367-70 (4th ed. 1983); Baxter, Choice of Law and the
Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 32 (1963) (describing Court's decision in Klaxon: "It so held
without making the most cursory reference to the language, history, or purpose of the Rules of Deci-
sion Act or the grant of diversity jurisdiction or to the history or purpose of the federal courts in
general."); Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 427, 444-45 (1958);
Horowitz, Toward A Federal Common Law of Choice of Law, 14 UCLA L. REV. 1191 (1967);
Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 772, 971 (1983); Trautman,
The Relation Between American Choice-of-Law and Federal Common Law, 41 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1977, at 105, 120; Weintraub, The Erie Doctrine and State Conflict of Laws Rules,
39 IND. L.J. 228, 246-48 (1964).
Klaxon was decided in the context of a bilateral dispute nearly 30 years before the advent of
multiparty multidistrict litigation. It satisfied Erie's desire for uniform application of state substantive
law whether in state or federal court. Mass tort litigation, on the other hand, presents a competing
need for the application of a uniform standard to all plaintiffs whose claims, although originating in
several states, have been consolidated in a single state.
9. Professors Miller and Crump have recently suggested that federal courts be free to make their
own choice of law decisions when exercising a proposed statutory multiparty, multistate jurisdiction.
See Miller & Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions After Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 78 (1986). This Note addresses the kinds of cases in which
federal courts should have such authority under ordinary diversity jurisdiction and proposes the set of
choice of law principles a federal statute conferring such authority should encompass.
10. Since conflict of laws rules are matters of state law, the few Supreme Court decisions in this
field address only the constitutional limits on choice of law. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,
105 S. Ct. 2965 (1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S.
410 (1979); see also cases discussed infra note 71 (constitutional limits on choice of law); ef. Day &
Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975) (reversing lower federal court's decision not to
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law decisions, is unlikely to articulate."" This Note therefore proposes that
Congress enact a choice of law statute enabling and directing federal
courts presiding over mass tort litigation to make choice of law decisions
that will promote both equity and efficiency.
The equity concerns beneath this proposal are twofold. First, current
law often precludes equity among plaintiffs in mass tort suits because dif-
ferent substantive laws likely will be applied to identical claims of simi-
larly situated parties. Equity among plaintiffs requires that a single rule
of decision apply to all like claims.12 Second, from society's point of view,
equity requires that victims of mass torts receive prompt, adequate, and
effective compensation for their injuries.13 Thus, within certain limits, the
proposed statute set forth in Section III requires that a court select the
most favorable substantive law available to plaintiffs. 4
This Note also addresses two types of efficiency in mass tort litigation.
First, the proposed statute removes choice of law barriers that discourage
the use of collective adjudication in mass torts and thereby deny mass tort
litigation the numerous judicial efficiencies that collective adjudication can
offer.1  Second, by eliminating the requirement that a federal court follow
several state choice of law rules, the proposed statute eliminates the ineffi-
ciencies this burden places on the court's choice of law decision. 6
follow state conflicts rule). The Court's due process analyses generally focus on the fairness to the
defendant of the choice of law decision under review and do not address the equitable treatment of
plaintiffs. Furthermore, the Court has not measured choice of law decisions against the efficiency
concerns raised in this Note. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. Finally, the Court has never
reviewed a choice of law decision in a mass accident case.
11. Indeed, the Court's terse reversal in Day & Zimmermann supports this assumption. In that
case, an injured serviceman and the estate of a deceased serviceman sought recovery of damages based
on the premature explosion of a howitzer round in Cambodia during the Vietnam War. A lower
federal court sitting in diversity had declined to follow Texas' lex loci delicti choice of law rule on the
theory that Cambodia, the place of the wrong, had "no interest in the case, no policy at stake."
Challoner v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 512 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir.), rev'd, 423 U.S. 3 (1975).
The Court, however, rejected the lower court's innovative approach, stating, "A federal court in a
diversity case is not free to engraft onto those state [conflict of laws] rules exceptions or modifications
which may commend themselves to the federal court, but which have not commended themselves to
the State in which the federal court sits." 423 U.S. at 4. The Court's position evinces a manifest
reluctance to prescribe the choice of law principles this Note argues are essential to fair and efficient
mass tort adjudication.
12. See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
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II. MASS TORT CHOICE OF LAW DECISIONS UNDER CURRENT LAW
A. An Illustration of the Problem
Consider the hypothetical case of a commercial airplane crash in State
A during a flight from State B to State C.17 Representatives of deceased
passengers file wrongful death actions against the plane manufacturer al-
leging inadequate instructions in the manufacturer's operating manual for
the plane.18 The manufacturer built the plane in State B but is incorpo-
rated and maintains its principal place of business in State E. The plain-
tiffs are from four states, A through D. Although some plaintiffs from all
four states file initially in State A,' 9 the majority file suit in their respec-
tive states of residence.20 The choice of law rules, liability standards for
17. The illustration in the text is based upon the air crash disaster cases cited above. See supra
note 3. Although the choice of law problems presented by this hypothetical are considerable, the
simplification of the issues and analyses that was necessary to condense these cases into a useful and
intelligible example actually obscures some complexity. The actual cases involve considerably more
states, countries, issues, and varied choice of law rules.
For example, in Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. 732, 742 (C.D. Cal. 1975), the federal court, upon
considering the choice of law rules of the twelve states from which the claims before it had been
consolidated, found that five states followed a "significant contacts" analysis, sometimes interchange-
ably with the "governmental-interest" or "public-interest" approach, six followed lex loci delicti, and
one, California, relied exclusively on the "governmental-interest" approach. Focusing on the substan-
tive rules uncovered by this multifaceted choice of law analysis, the court found that the measure of
damages recoverable also varied: "One state limits the amount to $50,000; another, to $75,000; four
allow full recovery with varying limitations; one has full recovery plus pain and suffering and mental
anguish; and five use 'compensatory' and, in some instances, 'pecuniary' [as the standard for recov-
ery]." Id. Applying these disparate laws would have been "chaotic, and against the faintest instinct for
justice by [meting out] unequal results to those standing in the same relationship to each other and to
the decedent." Id. at 741.
Relying upon the Fifth Circuit's not-then-overruled decision in Challoner v. Day & Zimmermann,
Inc., 512 F.2d 77 (5th Cir.), rev'd, 423 U.S. 3 (1975), the court in Paris Air Crash rejected Klaxon
and employed instead a single choice of law formula to guarantee that a single substantive rule would
govern all claims. 399 F. Supp. at 747. This Note's proposed statute grants to federal judges the
autonomy so sensibly seized in Paris Air Crash.
18. Cf Washington, D.C. Air Crash, 559 F. Supp. 333, 345-46 (D.D.C. 1983) (defects in manu-
facturer's operating manual governed by strict liability standard under District of Columbia law, by
negligence standard under Washington state law).
19. For various strategic reasons, some plaintiffs may deem it more advantageous to file suit in the
district where the crash occurred. See, e.g., Boston Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. 1106, 1115 (D. Mass.
1975) (claimants from Virginia, Kentucky, and New Hampshire file initially in Massachusetts, site of
crash).
20. Assuming the manufacturer does substantial business in States A through D-for example,
each state has one or more interstate airports-such business activities would constitute "minimum
contacts" for purposes of obtaining personal jurisdiction over the manufacturer in all these states.
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (requiring link between defendant's conduct and forum such that
defendant could reasonably foresee suit in that forum).
For diversity purposes, a corporation is deemed to be a citizen of both its state of incorporation and
the state where it maintains its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1982). A corporation
sued in one of those two states may not remove the case to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982).
Thus, if under the hypothetical posed in the text, some of the claimants were citizens of State E, they
would not be able to sue the plane manufacturer in federal court, because there would be no diversity
of citizenship. The requirement of complete diversity is, however, statutory rather than constitutional
and can, therefore, be eliminated by Congress. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386
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defective manuals, and measure of damages rules in the five states are as
follows:21
TABLE I
State Choice of Law Rule Standard of Liability Measure of Damages
A governmental interest negligence unlimited
B Leflar strict liability unlimited
C lex loci delicti strict liability limited
D comparative impairment strict liability limited
E governmental interest negligence limited
Under 28 U.S.C. § 140422 and 28 U.S.C. § 1407,23 the scattered actions
would be transferred and consolidated for pre-trial purposes before the
district court in State A.2' The Supreme Court's decision in Van Dusen v.
Barrack25 requires a transferee court to apply the law of the transferor
U.S. 523 (1967) ("minimal diversity" permissible under article III); see also D. LOUISELL, G.
HAZARD & C. TAIT, PLEADING AND PROCEDURE: STATE AND FEDERAL CASES AND MATERIALS
469 (5th ed. 1983) (complete diversity a statutory requirement). Congress should remove this require-
ment to permit complete joinder in mass tort cases.
21. The choice of law methodologies listed in Table I are discussed infra notes 28-39 and accom-
panying text.
22. "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may
transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) (1982).
23. "When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pending in different
districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pre-trial pro-
ceedings." 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1982). Transfer under § 1407(a) may be made by the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation upon the panel's own initiative or by motion filed with the panel by a
party. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c) (1982).
24. A general rule of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation is that the most efficient and
expeditious resolution of domestic air disaster litigation is best achieved by transferring all actions to
the district of the situs of the crash. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Natchitoches Parish, La. on Sept.
20, 1973, 407 F. Supp. 1401, 1402 (J.P.M.D.L. 1976).
Although § 1407 was intended to apply only to pre-trial proceedings, Rule 11(b) of the Panel's
Rules of Procedure gives the transferee court the authority to transfer all cases to itself for all pur-
poses under § 1404. R. PROC. J.P.M.D.L. 11(b), 28 U.S.C. fol. § 1407 (1982). Thus, in practice,
most multidistrict cases are disposed of in a single court. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Near Duarte, Cal.,
on June 6, 1971, 357 F. Supp. 1013, 1016 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (explaining transferee court's § 1404
transfer of all actions to itself on grounds that remanding actions to different transferor courts "may
produce different results in different districts. Such a result in this case is certainly 'not in the interest
of justice' "); see also In re New York City Mun. Sec. Litig., 572 F.2d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1978) ("More-
over the pretrial proceedings encompassed by § 1407 include summary judgment, and history has
indicated that once the limited transfer has occurred, the transferor district is not likely to see the case
again."); D. HERR, MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 211 (1986) ("In practice remand has proven the
exception rather than the rule in multidistrict litigation."); Note, The Judicial Panel and the Con-
duct of Multidistrict Litigation, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1001 (1974) (discussing infrequency of retransfers
to transferor courts). Of the 12,484 multidistrict cases remanded or terminated by transferee courts
between 1968 and 1985, less than 25% were remanded to the transferor districts. ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (1985), re-
printed in RECORDS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
168 (1985).
25. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
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court in cases transferred under the federal transfer statutes. 6 Therefore,
the transferee court would make choice of law decisions as follows:27
Claims Brought Originally in State A: Employing State A's
governmental-interest" approach, the transferee court would choose the
applicable law from among those states whose contacts create an "inter-
est" in having their law applied. Because residence is deemed to create
such an interest, 29 the transferee court would consider the laws of States
A, B, C, and D, the claimants' domiciles, and of State E, the manufac-
turer's principal place of business and place of incorporation.3 0 There
would be no conflict concerning the applicable standard of liability with
respect to claimants from State A since both States A and E employ a
negligence standard requiring proof of manufacturer's fault. For claimants
26. The basic rationale underlying Van Dusen is that when jurisdiction over the defendant is
proper in the transferor court, the defendant should not be able to avoid the law of that state simply
by transferring the case to another district. Several circuit courts have held, however, that if jurisdic-
tion over the defendant was lacking in the original forum, the transferee court must apply the law of
the state in which it sits, regardless of which party requested transfer. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Volvo of
America Corp., 734 F.2d 1221, 1223 (7th Cir. 1984); Roofing & Sheet Metal Serv., Inc. v. La
Quinta Motor Inns, 689 F.2d 982, 992 (11 th Cir. 1982); Ellis v. Great Southwestern Corp., 646 F.2d
1099, 1110 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981); Martin v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 469, 472 (6th Cir. 1980).
Conversely, the same courts have held that if jurisdiction was proper, the state law of the original
forum should govern the action, regardless of which party requested transfer. Gonzalez, 734 F.2d at
1224; La Quinta Motor Inns, 689 F.2d at 992-93; Martin, 623 F.2d at 473. See generally Note,
Choice of Law in Federal Court After Transfer of Venue, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 149 (1977) (determi-
nation of applicable law after transfer should be based on propriety of venue and personal jurisdiction
in initial forum).
Professor Weintraub offers an interesting argument critical of the requirement that a § 1404 trans-
feree court look to the law of the transferor district by noting that "the plaintiff is not 'traditionally'
entitled to select an inconvenient forum. But for the flexibility that 1404(a) provides when the plain-
tiff has selected an inconvenient forum, the sanction might be dismissal of the complaint and with it
the plaintiff's advantage in being able to select his law with his forum." Weintraub, supra note 8, at
258-59. On the other hand, deference to the law of the transferee court might create an unfair forum-
shopping advantage for defendants. Consistent with the thesis of this Note, the best solution would be
to let the transferee district court make its own determination as to which state's law is most
appropriate.
27. Van Dusen has been interpreted to require the transferee court to follow the choice of law
rules of the transferor court. See, e.g., Agent Orange, 580 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (transferee
court must follow choice of law rules of transferor court); Washington, D.C. Air Crash, 559 F. Supp.
333 (D.D.C. 1983) (same).
28. See B. CURRIE, SELECTED EsSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963); Currie, Comments on
Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1242-43
(1963). Under Professor Currie's "governmental-interest" analysis, a court's determination of whether
a state has an interest in having its law applied requires analysis of the policies underlying the partic-
ular law.
29. See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963)
(applying New York law instead of Canadian guest statute where car accident occurred in Canada
but both parties were New York residents). Interest analysis places near-exclusive reliance on domi-
cile or residence as an interest-generating factor. This is apparent from the most significant contribu-
tion of interest analysis to the choice of law field: namely, the identification of "false conflicts"-cases
in which, because opposing parties are residents of the same state, only that state is likely to have an
interest in having its law applied. See also Boston Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. 1106, 1115 n.13 (D.
Mass. 1975) (false conflict can also arise when laws of several interested states are compatible).
30. See, e.g., Washington, D.C. Air Crash, 559 F. Supp. at 343 (state of principal place of busi-
ness has interest in law applied to plane manufacturer).
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from States B, C, and D, a true conflict would arise between the strict
liability rules of those states and the negligence standard of State E. Pro-
fessor Currie has suggested that in cases of true conflict forum law should
apply.31 Assuming that State A courts follow Currie's suggestion, the
transferee court would apply the negligence rule of State A to the claim-
ants from States B, C, and D who initially filed there.
As applied to the measure of damages, this analysis would lead the
transferee court to apply unlimited recovery rules to claimants from States
A and B and limited recovery rules to claimants from States C and D.
Claimants from A and B benefit from State A's unlimited recovery law
due to a true conflict with State E's law and the transferee court's conse-
quent deferral to forum law. Conversely, because the laws of States C, D,
and E impose limits on recovery, no conflict exists and a limited recovery
law would apply to the State C and D claims.3 2
Claims Brought Originally in State B: State B courts follow Professor
Leflar's choice-influencing-factors approach under which selection of the
"better law" and advancement of the forum's legitimate governmental in-
terests are the decisive factors for resolving conflicts questions.33 Under
this standard, the transferee court would probably find that a State B
court would prefer State B's strict liability and unlimited recovery laws to
State E's negligence and limited liability rules. The transferee court
would, therefore, apply State B's law to the claims filed in State B.34
Claims Brought Originally in State C: Under the traditional rule of lex
loci delicti, followed in State C, a court looks to the law of the "state
where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort"
took place. 5 Thus, the transferee court would find that a State C court
31. Currie, supra note 28, at 1242-43 ("If, upon reconsideration, the court finds that a conflict
between the legitimate interests of the two states is unavoidable, it should apply the law of the
forum.").
32. This illustration assumes that the states' limited recovery laws impose the same limit on recov-
ery. Were this not the case, a court would still probably not find a true conflict and would apply the
recovery limit of the claimant's state. See Currie, supra note 28, at 1242 (suggesting "more moderate
and restrained interpretation of [one state's] policy or interest" in cases of "apparent conflict").
33. See Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 170, 203 N.W.2d 408, 417 (1973) (compelling factors
under Leflar approach are advancement of forum's governmental interest and application of better
law). In addition to the two factors referred to in the text, Professor Leflar's approach contains three
other choice-influencing factors: (1) predictability of results; (2) maintenance of interstate and interna-
tional order; and (3) simplification of the judicial task. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-
Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584, 1586-87 (1966).
34. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307, 319 (1981) (upholding Minnesota's selec-
tion of its own law on "better law" grounds and discussing Minnesota's interest in "full compensation
for 'resident accident victims' to keep them 'off welfare rolls' and able 'to meet financial obligations'"
(quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 289 N.W.2d 43, 49 (Minn. 1978))).
35. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-379 (1934). Prior to the revolution in
choice of law during the 1950's and 1960's, the substantive law of the place of injury, lex loci delicti,
universally governed the rights and liabilities of parties to a tort suit.
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would apply State A's negligence and unlimited recovery laws to the
claims originally filed in State C.
Claims Brought Originally in State D: Professor Baxter's comparative
impairment analysis attempts to resolve true conflicts by considering
which of the interested states' policies would be impaired most by applica-
tion of another state's law. 6 The laws of States D and E differ only as to
standards of liability. Considering that the purpose underlying a rule of
strict liability may be twofold,37 a State D court would probably hold that
State D's policy in favor of facilitating recovery by tort victims against
manufacturers would suffer more harm were its law not applied for the
benefit of its residents than would State E's interest in protecting its resi-
dent corporations from excessive liability were its law rejected., Thus,
the transferee court would apply State D's strict liability and limited re-
covery laws to the claims originally filed in State D."
The following chart summarizes the findings of the transferee court:
TABLE II
Plaintiffs* State of Filing Standard of Liability Damages
A A negligence unlimited
B B strict liability unlimited
B' A negligence unlimited
C C negligence unlimited
C' A negligence limited
D D strict liability limited
D' A negligence limited
* B', C', and D' denote, respectively, plaintiffs from States B, C, and D who
initially filed in State A.
B. Current Law Does Not Achieve Equity or Efficiency
The common claims of victims of single-incident mass torts are increas-
ingly resolved through some form of collective adjudication.40 In theory,
36. See Baxter, supra note 8.
37. A state may impose strict liability on tortfeasors both to deter harmful conduct and to facilitate
recovery by tort victims.
38. Cf Washington, D.C. Air Crash, 559 F. Supp. 333, 346-47, 351 (D.D.C. 1983) (noting,
without finding controlling, Washington State's legislatively expressed interest in providing fair treat-
ment and protection for its resident corporations).
39. Cf Boston Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. 1106, 1114 (D. Mass. 1975) (Massachusetts' interest in
deterring harmful conduct and limiting liability of defendant doing business within its borders
"materially and substantially less than that of New Hampshire in adequately providing for survivors
of its own resident decedents").
40. Single-incident mass torts produce claims that squarely fit the consolidation requirements of
28 U.S.C. § 1407 and are routinely collected in a single forum. The Supreme Court's decision in
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. 2965 (1985), increases the likelihood that such claims will
be brought as class actions, See Miller & Crump, supra note 9; see also In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
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collective adjudication is more efficient because it minimizes the time and
resources expended by courts, facilitates and expedites the settlement of
claims, and avoids concurrent or sequential resolutions of claims arising
from the same set of facts. 4' Moreover, collective adjudication theoretically
is more equitable because it avoids disparate recoveries by injured parties
and inconsistent standards of conduct for tortfeasors,42 reduces inequalities
in bargaining power between plaintiffs and defendants, 4 '3 and lowers the
risk that early claimants will deplete available compensation funds and
cause an inequitable allocation of compensatory and punitive damages."
In practice, however, as the hypothetical case illustrates, choice of law
problems derail the equity and efficiency advantages that collective adjudi-
Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 720 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (certifying FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) class action),
mandamus denied sub noma. In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858 (2d. Cir.), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984); In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 95 F.R.D. 483, 486 (W.D. Mo. 1982)
(granting FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) class certification regarding issues of compensatory damage liabil-
ity, punitive damages liability, and amount of punitive damages); Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43
(E.D. Ky. 1977) (prosecution of individual actions following nightclub fire created risk of imposing
inconsistent standards of conduct or of reducing limited fund in manner that would impair ability of
subsequent plaintiffs to protect their interests), mandamus denied sub nom. Union Light, Heat &
Power Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 588 F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 443 U.S. 913
(1979); Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558, 561 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (issue of liability
for food poisoning on cruise ship certified under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A) primarily to avoid
inconsistent adjudications), affd mem., 507 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1975); Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp.,
350 F. Supp. 624 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (issue of liability in air crash certified under FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(1)(A) and 23(b)(1)(B) to avoid inconsistent adjudications and prevent impairment of plaintiffs'
ability to protect their interests).
For proposals encouraging greater use of collective adjudication, see Rosenberg, The Causal Con-
nection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REv. 851
(1984) (proposing class action treatment of mass exposure claims with causation and assignment of
liability determined under proportionality rule); Note, Class Certification in Mass Accident Cases
Under Rule 23(bXl), 96 HARV. L. REv. 1143 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Class Certification in Mass
Accident Cases]; Note, Class Actionsfor Punitive Damages, 81 MscH. L. REv. 1787 (1983).
41. See, e.g., Miller & Crump, supra note 9:
When many injuries are traceable to a single incident, almost all liability inquiries, including
most questions of specific causation, are focused on an event that occurred at a definite time
and place. As a result, gains in both efficiency and equity from group resolution may be
greater than in other mass tort cases.
Id. at 44; see also Note, Class Certification in Mass Accident Cases, supra note 40, at 1144-46
(discussing efficiency gains from collective adjudication).
From a judicial perspective, efficiency frequently means collective adjudication of cases presenting
common questions of law or fact. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982) (authoriz-
ing transfer for consolidated pre-trial proceedings of actions involving one or more common questions
of fact); In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La. on July 9, 1982, 548 F. Supp. 1268
(J.P.M.D.L. 1982) (citing promotion of just and efficient conduct of litigation as support for § 1407
transfer). From a claimant's perspective, efficiency often means lower litigation costs through quick
resolution by settlement or trial. For a mass tort litigant, such efficiencies may be realized through
greater use of class actions and coordinated representation. Finally, the efficient result for society can
be measured by whether and to what extent the legal system's resolution of an issue encourages
behavior that will in the long run reduce the total costs of accidents to society. See generally G.
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
42. See Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (discussed supra note 17 & infra
note 49).
43. See Note, Class Certification in Mass Accident Cases, supra note 40, at 1145.
44. Id.
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cation otherwise promises. The transferee court's obligation to discover
what law some state other than the one in which it sits would find appli-
cable requires considerable expenditure of judicial resources. 5 Because
varying state laws fragment claimants' initially common interests, such
pre-trial choice of law rulings quickly dissipate the efficiency gains collec-
tive adjudication is intended to achieve.4 Further, the transferee court's
choice of law rulings produce four distinct combinations of laws governing
the claims of similarly situated parties. 47 Thus, while claimants originally
filing in State B can receive unlimited recovery under a strict liability
standard, claimants from States C and D who originally filed in State A
must prove fault on the part of the manufacturer to obtain even a limited
recovery.48 The disparate effects of such rulings on the settlement values
of otherwise identical claims of the plaintiffs contravene the intent of a
legal system that strives to compensate the victims of mass torts fairly.49
45. As one district court judge has stated:
The law on "choice of law" in the various states and in the federal courts is a veritable jungle,
which, if the law can be found out, leads not to a "rule of action" but a reign of chaos domi-
nated in each case by the judge's "informed guess" as to what some other state than the one in
which he sits would hold its law to be.
Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. 732, 739 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
46. Under current law, class certification by itself probably does not ensure uniformity with re-
spect to either choice of law or substantive rules. See Agent Orange, 580 F. Supp. 690, 695 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (Weinstein, C.J.) ("Certifying this as a class action with residents of different states as plain-
tiffs does not, we assume . . . reduce all disputes within the litigation to one subject to the substantive
and conflicts of law rules of New York. . . . Where relevant state substantive and conflicts rules are
not uniform, certification does not, we will assume, provide uniformity."); see also infra note 101
(recent proposals for greater use of class actions acknowledge choice of law problems).
Judge Weinstein's assumptions have been confirmed in part by the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 105 S.Ct. 2965 (1985), where the Court reversed on due process
grounds a Kansas court's application of Kansas' substantive law to all plaintiffs in a nationwide class
action. The Court held that Kansas did not have sufficient contacts with the out-of-state claims to
warrant the application of its law to all claims. The Court did not, however, suggest that uniform
application of a single state's law would be impermissible where sufficient contacts were present.
47. In this way equity among like claimants is violated. Cf. Boston Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. 1106
(D. Mass. 1975). There the transferee district court found that the various forms of interest
analysis-"significant contacts," "substantial contacts," "domicile of decedent," and "public pol-
icy"-of Vermont, New Hampshire, New York, and Florida, respectively, pointed to the substantive
law of the state of domicile to govern the claims initially filed in each state. Together with the appli-
cation of lex loci delicti to those claims originally filed in Massachusetts, the court's choice of law
decisions effectively limited the damages recoverable by some of the crash victims without limiting the
damages available to others. Id. at 1115; see also supra note 17 (discussing potential for inequitable
result in Paris Air Crash).
48. Presiding over a similar situation, the district court judge in the Chicago Air Crash case
commented:
It is unjust as well as ludicrous that such issues as the standard of liability (no-fault, compara-
tive negligence, contributory negligence), the measure of damages, [and] whether . . . damages
for pain and suffering are recoverable . . . should vary from case to case arising out of the
same disaster depending on the vagaries of the applicable state law.
In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979, 526 F. Supp. 226, 233 (N.D. I11.
1981).
49. Thus, current choice of law decisionmaking does not achieve equitable results for mass tort
victims as a group.
Society's desire to compensate tort victims fairly and adequately can be seen in several recent legal
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Equal treatment of similar claims is a fundamental principle of Ameri-
can law.50 Counterbalancing this principle of equality is the delegation of
substantial lawmaking authority to the individual states within our federal
system. 51 Because states have different laws on many issues, a litigant
suing in one state may often recover while his counterpart suing in a
neighboring state on a similar transaction does not. It is one thing to con-
template the disparate ways different state laws may resolve a given dis-
pute; it is quite another to accept such disparities in the context of a mass
tort suit consolidated in a single forum adjudicating, for example, the
identical claims of passengers sitting side by side aboard an airplane. 2
Unlike the victims of single-incident mass torts, non-mass tort victims do
not share all the characteristics that largely determine which legal rules
will apply to their claims.5" Nor does the adjudication of their claims trig-
ger the federal interest raised by multistate mass torts.54 On the other
developments. The movement in tort law toward unrestricted recovery has led to the relative disuse of
such anti-recovery doctrines as assumption of risk and contributory negligence as complete bars to
recovery and to the expansion of strict liability across a range of issues in products liability. See, e.g.,
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62-63, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697,
700 (1962) (listing expanding range of products that carry strict liability).
The arguments for unlimited compensation carry even greater weight in the context of mass torts.
The victims of mass accidents ordinarily have no control over what happens to them and thus cannot
be said to possess the responsibility traits upon which rules that limit or wholly deny recovery par-
tially rely:
The decedents bought a ticket, got on a plane, and were killed. Not only did they have nothing
to do with the relationships between the defendants, but they had no way of finding them out
or learning of any acts or efforts of defendants to correct or prevent defects in the plane or its
parts, or not to do so.
In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 69 F.R.D. 310, 321 (C.D. Cal. 1975). In recent years,
Congress has addressed the issue of compensation for victims of certain mass accidents. See, e.g.,
Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1982) (establishing $560 million aggregate liability for single
nuclear incident resulting from operation of federally licensed private nuclear power plant). In re-
sponse to critics of the Price-Anderson Act's limitation on aggregate liability, Professor Arthur
Murphy has argued that the Act, though limiting liability, has at least ensured the availability of
some amount of compensation funds that private insurers would otherwise be reluctant to provide. See
N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1986 at A30, col. 3.
50. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 410 (1953) (Erie was "designed to ensure
that litigants with the same kind of case would have their rights measured by the same legal standards
of liability").
51. U.S. CONsT. amend. X. provides, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively . .. .
52. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987, 999 (2d Cir. 1980) (Feinberg,
C.J., dissenting) ("If state law is applied in the present litigation . . . then veterans may well be
subjected to sharply differing rules of law in the pursuit of their remedies . . . [and their] recoveries
for Agent Orange injuries will vary widely."); Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal
Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 417-18 (1964) (criticizing application of different state laws
to mass tort suits as producing "seeming injustice that the estate of one passenger might recover
without limit whereas that of the man sitting next to him could get only a small sum").
53. Although mass tort victims also are not alike in all respects-e.g., they may be from different
states-the characteristics to which the text refers are the individual tort victim's active traits that a
court would consider to resolve a question of contributory negligence or causation. These so-called
active traits would, by definition, see supra note 1, be the same for single-incident, multistate mass
tort victims. Cf. supra note 49 (mass tort victims have little control over accident causing injury).
54. See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
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hand, the inherently interstate nature of the accidents that harm mass tort
victims and the commonality of the victims' factual claims both raise an
interest in, and permit the realization of, unified recovery standards.
Thus, society's interest and the interests of individual victims in the integ-
rity of mass tort adjudication require that the principles of equity ad-
vanced in this Note override competing values of federalism in mass tort
litigation. 55
III. CONGRESS' ROLE IN REMOVING THE CHOICE OF LAW IMPASSE
Lower federal courts face two major obstacles to fair and efficient choice
of law decisionmaking in mass tort litigation: a melange of biased and
rigid state choice of law rules56 and Supreme Court decisions that compel
application of those rules in diversity suits. 57 The present situation is un-
likely to change without congressional action.
A. A Judicial Solution is Unlikely
1. State Choice of Law Doctrine
Analysis of state choice of law rules incorporating the modern ap-
proach5 "8 reveals why those rules are unlikely to produce equity and effi-
ciency in mass tort litigation. First, as the example in Section I demon-
strates, the heavy emphasis that interest analysis places on domicile
requires a federal court presiding over a mass tort suit to consider the
substantive laws of several states.59 Because state laws often vary, this re-
quirement virtually ensures that different laws will govern similar claims.
In addition, the greater the number of states represented by the claimants,
55. Cf Miller & Grump, supra note 9, at 71 (federalism benefits of non-collective adjudication
"hardly would be worthwhile" if there is risk of insufficient or no recovery by injured parties).
56. Twenty-nine states use one or more of six modern choice rules, while 16 states adhere to the
traditional lex loci delicti. See Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER
L. REV. 521 (1983). In this exhaustive survey of state choice rules, Professor Kay records with some
skepticism the energetic, yet slightly muddled, adoption of modern choice formulas by a number of
states and the surprising tenacity with which a considerable number of states have resisted change.
57. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S.
487 (1941).
58. The focus in this section is on interest analysis. The rule of lex loci delicti certainly forecloses
biases in favor of both domicile and forum law. Thus, if all states adhered to the traditional rule,
many of the choice of law problems federal courts face in mass accident litigation would be eliminated,
albeit at the cost of any overall strategy to improve mass tort adjudication. The legal system can, and
should be encouraged to, do better. The crux of the choice of law dilemma in mass tort suits is the
mix of choice rules applied, not the difficulty of the principled inquiry some modern rules require. A
choice of law solution for mass tort suits should not retreat to the traditional rule; rather, it should
incorporate in workable form some of the insights modern choice methods have advanced.
59. See supra notes 17-39 and accompanying text.
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the more unmanageable will be the court's task in organizing and follow-
ing numerous different bodies of complex substantive principles."0
Second, the tendency of state courts to favor forum law reinforces the
emphasis that interest analysis places on domicile. Professor Currie
felt-with some resignation-that the selection of forum law is the inevi-
table resolution of true conflicts."' Modifications of Professor Currie's ap-
proach have failed to offset the bias toward forum law. 2 Under the "com-
parative impairment" approach, the court hearing the case can more
easily assess, and hence is more sympathetic to, the detrimental effects to
its state's sovereignty should its law be ignored than the harm to another
state if the latter's law is rejected."3 Similarly, under the "better law"
component of Professor Leflar's choice-influencing-factors approach, a
state court is naturally inclined to feel that its law is the better one.64
2. Federal Choice of Law Doctrine
Although its decision in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing
Co."3 has received much scholarly criticism,6 6 the Supreme Court recently
reiterated the obligation of federal courts to follow the choice of law rules
of the states in which they sit.67 As in Klaxon, the Court's narrow focus
60. Cf Miller & Crump, supra note 9, at 64 (discussing court's heavy burden in 50-state action).
61. See Currie, supra note 28, at 1242-43 (containing Currie's advice for resolution of true
conflicts):
§ 4. If, upon reconsideration, the court finds that a conflict between the legitimate interests
of two states is unavoidable, it should apply the law of the forum.
§ 5. If the forum is disinterested, but an unavoidable conflict exists between the laws of the
two other states, . it should apply the law of the forum-until someone comes along with a
better idea.
Id.
62. In addition to the modern approaches discussed in the text, other variations on interest analy-
sis include Professor Ehrenzweig's lexfori approach. See Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori-Basic Rule in
the Conflict of Laws, 58 MICH. L. REv. 637 (1960) (offsetting strong presumption for forum law
with preference for strict use of forum non conveniens dismissals); see also von Mehren, Recent
Trends in Choice of Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 927 (1975) (advocating principled
weighing of conflicting policies).
63. See, e.g., Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 320, 546 P.2d 719, 723, 128 Cal. Rptr.
215, 219 (1976) (California's interests would be more impaired if Nevada law were applied than
would be Nevada's if California law were applied); see also Note, Choice of Law for True Conflicts,
65 CALIF. L. REV. 290, 303 (1977) (courts of different states will arrive at different judgments about
the relative degree of impairment to their external objectives in close cases).
64. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (discussed supra note 34 & infra note
71); Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 171, 203 N.W.2d 408, 417 (1973) (Minnesota's common law
rule of liability superior to Canada's guest statute and thus applicable even where both litigants from
Canada); E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 8, at 31 (several states now follow "better law" approach,
"almost invariably with the result that the 'better law' [is] found to be that of the forum"); Brilmayer,
Legitimate Interests in Multistate Problems: As Between State and Federal Law, 79 MICH. L. REv.
1315, 1326 n.55 (1983) (better law "almost invariably turns out to be the forum's own rule of
decision").
65. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
66. See supra note 8.
67. Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975).
1089
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 96: 1077, 1987
in Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner8 underscores its apparent ac-
ceptance of the limitations that state choice of law rules place on a federal
court's ability to make equitable and efficient choice of law decisions in a
multidistrict mass tort case. 9 Beyond Klaxon, moreover, the Court's rul-
ing in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague"0 that there exist few constitu-
tional limitations on a state court's choice of law decision7 1 has the indi-
rect effect of affirming a solicitude for local policies and interests that is
antithetical to the goals sought in mass tort adjudication.
Even if, however, the Court were today presented with an opportunity
to overrule Klaxon, and did so, choice of law decisionmaking problems in
mass tort litigation would persist. Given that choice of law rules are pri-
marily the product of state common law, the Court would be reluctant to
go beyond a mere reversal of Klaxon and, in effect, preempt an area of
state law by issuing a set of choice of law guidelines for the lower federal
courts. Furthermore, the choice of law principles proposed by this Note
indirectly address the question of appropriate remedies under tort law,
which, like choice of law, is an area of law into which the Court rarely
ventures. The policy considerations of such implicit involvement in tort
law suggest that Congress is a more appropriate federal body to effect
comprehensive change.
B. A Congressional Solution
Whether Congress has the authority to intervene in this matter is ap-
parent from both the text of the Constitution 2 and recent congressional
68. 423 U.S. 3 (1975).
69. As discussed above, see supra note 11, the Court's reaffirmance of Klaxon in Day & Zimmer-
man rejected a federal court's innovative attempt to elude an overly restrictive state choice of law rule.
70. 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (plurality opinion per Brennan, J.).
71. In Hague, the plurality's insistence that a "significant aggregation" of contacts was necessary
to create a constitutionally sufficient interest for a state to apply its own law was somewhat discredited
by the transparency of the Minnesota contacts the Court deemed significant. See Brilmayer, supra
note 64, at 1318-19. For a discussion of the minimal constitutional limitations that do exist, see John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936) (postoccurrence change of residence to
forum state alone inadequate to support choice of law decision); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397
(1930) (nominal residence alone inadequate to support choice of law decision); cf. Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. 2965 (1985) (rejecting forum state's application of its own law to out-of-state
claims in class action suit where 97% of plaintiff-class members were non-residents and 99% of the
gas leases in dispute were also out-of-state).
Professors Miller and Crump suggest that the constitutional limits in the Court's recent choice of
law decisions in Shutts and Allstate should be interpreted "to limit unreasonable forum shopping and
preserve parties' expectations." Miller & Crump, supra note 9, at 62. The choice of law principles set
forth in this Note's proposed statute, infra Section IV (tortfeasor's reasonable expectations one of
three principal factors in choice of law decision), accord with this interpretation of the constitutional
parameters of choice of law decisions.
72. The analysis in the text relies primarily on the affirmative grant to Congress under the full
faith and credit clause. See also Miller & Crump, supra note 9, at 78 (expressing "little doubt that
congressional power to enact a choice of law rule exists under the diversity jurisdiction, due process,
privileges and immunities, commerce, equal protection, and full faith and credit clauses of the
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action. The second sentence of the Constitution's full faith and credit
clause73 grants Congress exclusive authority to prescribe the manner in
which extraterritorial effect is to be given to the "Acts, Records, and [judi-
cial] Proceedings" of the states."' The general implementing statute passed
by the first Congress prescribes that the full faith and credit due a state's
acts, records and proceedings is the same as that which "they have by law
or usage in the courts of . . . [the rendering] State."'7 5 While "full faith
and credit" has proved to be an intelligible standard for the effect to be
given to records and judgments that have unambiguous application, its
insufficiency as an analytical basis for choice of law decisions-which re-
quire a balancing of competing state laws of presumptively equal
weight-has led courts to ignore its effect in the conflicts context and to
enforce its prescription only as to records and judgments. 6
Constitution").
This Note suggests a structural analysis to elicit the constitutional policies congressional involve-
ment would serve. The Constitution endows all citizens with the right to travel and conduct commerce
freely across state lines. An unfortunate consequence of freedom of mobility in modern technological
society is the recurring phenomenon of mass torts. It is well settled that the commerce and equal
protection clauses empower Congress to enact legislation ameliorating the inequities that varying state
laws may impose on those involved in interstate commerce. See, e.g., Federal Employers' Liability
Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982). In this regard, there are few, if any, substantive restraints on Con-
gress' power under the commerce clause. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985).
A statutory solution designed to enhance the judicial system's ability to administer personal injury
and wrongful death claims arising from tortious behavior inextricably connected to interstate com-
merce is therefore an appropriate, albeit novel, exercise of Congress' power to address inherently
interstate problems within our federal system.
73. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general
Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the
Effect thereof."
74. The proposition that the full faith and credit clause empowers Congress to establish choice of
law rules is widely accepted. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 366 (full faith and credit clause
an affirmative grant of authority to Congress to create uniform body of conflicts principles); Baxter,
supra note 8, at 22-42; Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State Choice of Law: Full Faith
and Credit, 12 M.m. ST. U.L. REv. 1, 62-63, 66-69 (1981) (Congress given exclusive authority
under full faith and credit clause to establish nationwide choice of law rules for states); see also
Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6 VAND. L. REv. 581, 585, 600 (1953) (federal
control over conflict of laws explicit in full faith and credit clause); Cook, The Powers of Congress
Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28 YALE L.J. 421, 422-26 (1919) (discussing range of
Congress' power over conflict of laws); Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the
Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 21-24 (1945) (same).
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
76. The statute proposed in this Note would require congressional involvement in the process by
which extraterritorial effect is to be given to state laws. In this regard, constitutional scholars once
disagreed as to whether the Framers intended the word "Acts" to include state decisional as well as
statutory law. For two reasons, the ambiguity today appears to have been resolved in favor of an
interpretation that places state common law rules within the compass of the word "Acts." First, Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("whether the law of the State shall be declared by its
Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern"),
disfavors an interpretation that would distinguish between statutory and decisional law, to the exclu-
sion of the latter. Jackson, supra note 74, at 12. Second, the importance of state courts as coequal in
their lawmaking authority to state legislatures favors an interpretation that accords equal weight to
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The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980" (PKPA) is a recent
example of congressional action under the full faith and credit clause to
enact a national standard where a compelling federal interest is present.
The statute was enacted to eliminate the harm to children caused by
"child-snatching" by requiring states to give full faith and credit to the
custody decrees of another jurisdiction. 8 Like its predecessor, the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act of 1968,"9 the PKPA was adopted to rem-
edy the chaos in interstate custody litigation caused by the Supreme
Court's failure to mandate the application of the full faith and credit
clause to the custody decrees of sister states.80 The statute contains a set of
uniform principles under which questions regarding the jurisdiction of a
court first issuing a decree, and thus by implication its choice of law, are
to be resolved.""
The PKPA resolves the full faith and credit issue explicitly by reference
to the validity of the jurisdiction of the rendering court. Because the ren-
dering court ordinarily would apply forum law in child custody decree
cases, however, the jurisdictional inquiry is equivalent to review of that
court's choice of law. 2 Designed to address an interstate problem that the
application of state choice of law rules would only exacerbate, the PKPA
can be viewed as a recent precedent firmly establishing Congress' ability
to legislate in the area of choice of law by issuing a set of uniform stan-
dards to be followed in state courts.
Congress should exercise its power where there is a demonstrable need
the efforts of both. See generally Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 436 (1943) (refer-
ring to full "faith and credit . . . to which local common and statutory law is entitled under the
Constitution and laws of the United States" (emphasis added)); Cheatham, supra note 74, at 602-03
(no difference in most states between statutory law and common law concerning full faith and credit
clause); Whitten, supra note 74, at 66-68 (decisions of modern state judges sufficiently analogous to
legislation to include decisional law within meaning of "acts," original meaning notwithstanding).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982).
78. For a concise explanation of the jurisdictional and choice of law aspects of child-snatching, see
Brilmayer, Credit Due Judgments and Credit Due Laws: The Respective Roles of Due Process and
Full Faith and Credit in the Interstate Context, 70 IowA L. REV. 95, 102-03 (1984).
79. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AcT, 9 U.L.A. 111 (1979).
80. See, e.g., Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958); see also
CHILD CUSTODY CLEARINGHOUSE AND INFORMATION EXCHANGE, INTERSTATE AND INTERNA-
TIONAL CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTE.S 10 (4th ed. 1984) (Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
designed to fill gap left by Supreme Court decisions).
81. See Flannery v. Stephenson, 416 So. 2d 1034 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982). These guidelines direct a
court to consider such factors as the residence of the child on the date of the commencement of the
initial proceeding, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(A)(i) (1982), evidence of mistreatment or abuse of the
child, id. at § 1738A(c)(2)(C)(ii), and the extent to which the best interest of the child was served by
the assumption of jurisdiction by the court first issuing the decree, id. at § 1738A(c)(2)(D)(ii).
82. See Weinberg, Choice of Law and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 440, 465 n.131
(1982) (discussing PKPA as determining choice of law); see also Averill, Choice-of-Law Problems
Raised by Sister State Judgments and the Full-Faith-and-Credit Mandate, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 686
(1969) (analyzing relationship between choice of law and concept of full faith and credit between
sister state judgments).
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in the federal system to provide national solutions to inherently interstate
problems.83 Choice of law decisions in mass tort cases constitute an inher-
ently federal problem for two reasons. First, most mass torts arise from
interstate economic activity and directly affect citizens from many states.
Second, the usefulness and availability of procedural devices created by
federal law84 have led litigants to rely almost exclusively upon federal
courts for the adjudication of mass tort claims.85 Particularly because the
nature of the problem requires something more than a narrowly drawn
judicial opinion, Congress is the proper source of federal standards.8"
IV. A STATUTORY SOLUTION
To remedy the choice of law problems described in Section I, Congress
should enact a law providing:
Whenever state law supplies the rule of decision on an issue in
litigation arising from a mass tort, 7 the federal court shall make its
83. Judge Friendly has written:
For Congress to direct a federal court sitting in State A whether to apply the internal law of
State A, B or C, or to use its own judgment which to apply, can well be said to be 'necessary
and proper' to enabling federal judges to function, and consistent with the general role of the
central government under the Constitution, in a way that prescription of a code of substantive
law to supplant the otherwise applicable law of a state is not.
Friendly, supra note 52, at 402 (citation omitted). It is important to emphasize that by limiting
Congress' role to enacting an essentially procedural rule, see Miller & Crump, supra note 9, at 78
n.534 (choice of law rules fairly characterized as procedural), this Note's proposed statute, infra
Section IV, does not encroach upon the states' authority to develop substantive bodies of tort law. The
favorable law preference of this Note's proposal does not invalidate this distinction. Procedural rules
commonly affect substantive results and include implicit value judgments.
84. See Miller & Crump, supra note 9, at 67, 70 (discussing federal courts' superior ability to
handle complex, multidistrict litigation); FED. R. Civ. P. 19, 20 (joinder), 23 (class actions), 24 (in-
tervention), 42 (consolidation); see also supra notes 22-23 (discussing federal transfer and consolida-
tion statutes). Following a § 1404 transfer of all cases to itself for all purposes, a transferee court may
then use Rule 42(a) to consolidate the actions for a single trial. See, e.g., In re Multidistrict Civil
Actions Involving the Air Crash Disaster Near Hanover, N.H. on Oct. 25, 1968, 342 F. Supp. 907,
908 (D.N.H. 1971).
85. For this reason, one could also argue that when presiding over multidistrict mass tort litiga-
tion, the lower federal courts no longer exercise jurisdiction coextensive with state courts. Thus, the
basic rationale beneath Erie and Klaxon may no longer hold true. There have been proposals to
prevent the application of Klaxon in situations where the federal court exercises jurisdiction beyond
that of the state in which it sits. See infra note 86.
86. See, e.g., Miller & Crump, supra note 9, at 78 & n.534 (discussing how choice of law rules
might be governed by federal statute); see also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION
OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 73, 402-04 (1969) (proposing statute
that would abrogate Klaxon where non-resident parties have been served pursuant to proposed dis-
persed necessary parties rule); H.R. 4159, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (proposal of Rep. Kastenmeier
to amend Judicial Code to permit cases of multidistrict litigation to be consolidated for purposes of
determining liability, including proposal to permit transferee court to determine source of substantive
law).
87. No attempt has been made here to define precisely various terms-e.g., "mass tort," "rule of
decision," and "parties similarly situated"-that will determine the statute's application in any partic-
ular case. For a general description of the kinds of mass torts this proposal is intended to reach, see
supra note 1. The principal criteria that will operate once the statute has been invoked are discussed
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own decision as to which state's law shall govern the rights and lia-
bilities of all parties similarly situated; in deciding this question, the
court shall: i) consider the laws of only those states with contacts to
the mass tort such that a defendant could reasonably have foreseen it
would be subject to those laws; ii) select from among the laws avail-
able the one most favorable to the plaintiffs; and iii) apply the same
law to the claims of similarly situated parties.
Analysis of the three primary features of the proposed statute demon-
strates the ways in which the statute would promote equitable and effi-
cient mass tort adjudication.
A. A Reasonable Expectations Standard
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,88 a plurality of the Court observed
that selection of a state's law comports with due process when it is neither
"arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."89 It is arguable that the Court's
finding that this standard was satisfied in Hague was based on an affir-
mance of the forum- and domicile-oriented policies characteristic of mod-
ern choice of law rules.90 The hypothetical case in Section II, however,
revealed how fidelity to forum and domicile interests contravenes the
equity and efficiency objectives of mass tort adjudication. 1 The proposed
statute therefore requires identification of available state laws based upon
infra notes 88-105 and accompanying text.
88. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
89. Id. at 313 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
90. Id. at 338 (Powell, J., dissenting) (criticizing plurality's emphasis on "presence of the plaintiff
and the fact that the deceased worked in the forum State").
91. See supra notes 17-49 and accompanying text. The heavy emphasis that interest analysis
places on domicile is not, however, entirely misplaced or illogical. A state's interest in issues of liabil-
ity and measure of damages, which directly affect the welfare of its citizens, is manifest. Offsetting this
state interest, however, is the federal interest in achieving equity and efficiency in the adjudication of
mass tort claims. Two strains of thought suggest that subordinating state interests to federal interests
is acceptable for choice of law decisionmaking in mass tort litigation. First, the discussion of contem-
porary choice of law doctrine, supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text, demonstrates that state
sovereignty is not significantly harmed by such a result. By definition, the resolution of any "true
conflict," through either the traditional or a modern approach, subordinates one state's legitimate
interest in having its law applied. Further, contemporary solutions to true conflicts-for example,
forum law (Currie), see supra note 31, or the "better law" (Leflar), see supra notes 33-34-are not
meaningfully attentive to any state's interest. See Chicago Air Crash, 644 F.2d 594, 630 (7th Cir.
1981) (selecting law of less interested forum where "interested" states' laws conflicted).
A second state sovereignty issue concerns the role of the federal court in making the choice of law
decision in the first place; that is, while it may be permissible for the states to override each other's
interests, it may be improper for federal courts to trump state interests. The discussion of federal
authority in the choice of law field under full faith and credit, supra notes 72-82 and accompanying
text, addresses this issue and concludes that the requisite federal authority and justification exist. For
a discussion of the jurisdictional aspects of this issue, see Brilmayer & Lee, State Sovereignty and the
Two Faces of Federalism: A Comparative Study of Federal Jurisdiction and the Conflict of Laws, 60
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 833, 860 (1985) (analyzing Supreme Court's "misconceived insistence that
federal and state courts are virtually interchangeable").
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the defendant's reasonable expectations regarding the laws that might gov-
ern its conduct. 2
A reasonable expectations standard serves a number of equity and effi-
ciency goals. Narrowing the range of substantive rules for consideration
reduces the time and resources required of a court making choice of law
decisions in a mass tort suit. By greatly increasing the predictability of the
applicable law, this prescription both facilitates the settlement of claims
and encourages defendants to insure themselves adequately against losses
that could conceivably arise under the laws of states affected by their ac-
tivities. Preparation by defendants for risk of loss furthers the compensa-
tion and loss-spreading policies of tort law and thus benefits both defend-
ants and plaintiffs. Finally, subjecting defendants to only those laws they
might reasonably have expected would govern their conduct better com-
ports with the due process standards required of choice of law decisions.
9 3
B. The Law Most Favorable to Plaintiffs
A principle common to most contemporary choice of law methods states
that choice of law decisions should further the policies underlying a par-
ticular field of law. 4 Insofar as two primary policy objectives of modern
tort law are deterrence and compensation,95 a rule requiring selection of
the law most favorable to the victims of mass torts is consistent with this
well-established norm.96 The need for swift and sure compensation is
92. Under the proposed statute's reasonable expectations standard, the transferee court in this
Note's hypothetical case, supra notes 17-39 and accompanying text, would have considered the laws
of States B, C, and E. The defendant manufacturer could reasonably have foreseen that accidents
involving the use of its planes might occur in the states of departure (B) and destination (C). See
Washington, D.C. Air Crash, 559 F. Supp. 333, 338 (D.D.C. 1983) (manufacturer "had to foresee
that its small, short-haul 737 aircraft would be used for departures from Washington National Air-
port"). Further, a corporate manufacturer would always expect to be subject to the substantive laws of
the states where it is incorporated (E), maintains its principal place of business (E), and manufactures
its product (B).
93. The "reasonable expectations" standard of personal jurisdiction doctrine, see World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), has not been incorporated in the Court's choice
of law decisions. Compare Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (plurality opinion) (due
process requires fundamental fairness) with id. at 337 (Powell, J., dissenting) (defendant's expecta-
tions are a measure of fundamental fairness). At least one commentator has noted the irony, or illogic,
in the Court's position. See Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV.
33, 88 (1978) ("To believe that a defendant's contacts with the forum state should be stronger under
the due process clause for jurisdictional purposes than for choice of law is to believe that an accused is
more concerned with where he will be hanged than whether.").
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(e) (1971) (among factors rele-
vant to choice of law are "basic policies underlying the particular field of law").
95. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
96. Several commentators on choice of law have argued for selection of the law most favorable to
the plaintiff. See, e.g., R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6.32 (3d ed.
1986) (proposing tort choice of law rules that favor plaintiffs unless state with favorable law "does not
have sufficient contact with the defendant or the defendant's actual or intended course of conduct to
make application of its law unreasonable"); Kiihne, Choice of Law in Products Liability, 60 CALIF.
L. REV. 1, 32 (1972) (apply law favorable to plaintiff).
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particularly urgent for mass accident victims who, because of the unpre-
dictability and potentially catastrophic consequences of such disasters, may
be severely disadvantaged by long-delayed or inadequate recoveries.
9 7
In less obvious ways, a choice of law rule requiring selection of the law
most favorable to plaintiffs enhances the efficiency of a judicial response to
mass disasters as well. Successful collective adjudication requires the
maintenance of an identity of interests among those with similar claims.
The knowledge that their claims will be governed by the most favorable of
available laws removes incentives for individual litigants to opt out and
pursue their claims individually." Thus, by crystallizing the common in-
terests of mass accident victims, the proposed statute's most-favorable-law
prescription leads to the realization of the efficiencies offered by collective
adjudication.
C. A Single Law for Like Claims
The directive that a court apply the same rule of law to the claims of
similarly situated parties releases federal courts from their obligation
under current law to follow the choice of law rules of the states in which
they sit.99 The judicial economies to be gained from permitting a federal
court presiding over mass tort litigation to sidestep the morass of ambigu-
ous, biased, and conflicting state choice of law rules are manifest.' 00 More
important, by ensuring that cases involving common questions of fact raise
common questions of law, the proposed statute removes a powerful deter-
rent to the increased use of the various procedures for collective adjudica-
tion available under current law."' In this way, the statute encourages
97. See In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 69 F.R.D. 310 (1975) (discussed supra note 49).
98. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing efficiencies from collective adjudication).
For a discussion of potentially conflicting interests of plaintiffs with large claims, see Note, Class
Certification in Mass Accident Cases, supra note 40, at 1147-49 (acknowledging substantial and
legitimate interests of those with large claims, author concludes that only way to achieve optimal
balance among all competing interests is through procedure that binds all plaintiffs in joint action).
99. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S.
487 (1941).
100. See Chicago Air Crash, 644 F.2d 594, 630-31 (7th Cir. 1981) (court unable to determine
choice of law rule of Hawaii); Melville v. American Home Assurance Co., 443 F. Supp. 1064, 1107
(E.D. Pa. 1977) ("It is difficult enough to apply a state's choice of law methodology rationally and
faithfully; it is confusion compounded when it is not initially clear which methodology is appropri-
ate."); see also Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. 732, 739 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (district court's choice of law
dilemma discussed supra note 17 and accompanying text).
101. Several collective adjudication procedures provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure require common questions of law or fact. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a) ("All persons may join
in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief. . . in respect of or arising out of the same
transaction, [or] occurrence . . . and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will
arise in the action."); id. 23(a)(2) ("One or more members of a class may sue . . . on behalf of all
only if [inter alia] . . . there are questions of law or fact common to the class . . ."); id. 42(a)
("When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order
a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions .... "). Choice of law
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efficiency for the judicial system, for litigants, and for society through the
collective adjudication of common claims arising from a single set of
facts.
1 0 2
Selection of a single substantive standard serves equity considerations as
well. By reducing the ex ante probability that a defendant will be subject
to different standards of liability, 03 the statute minimizes uncertainty in
the articulation of standards of conduct for mass tortfeasors104 By elimi-
nating the ex post application of more than one substantive standard, it
also avoids inconsistency in the burdens those with identical claims must
meet in order to recover. Finally, the collective adjudication encouraged by
the statute's "same law" prescription avoids the threat that individualized
adjudication under diverse laws poses to the equitable allocation of poten-
tially limited compensation funds.'05
V. CONCLUSION
This Note seeks to stimulate a reappraisal of choice of law doctrine at
the state and federal levels in light of the singularly multistate features of
mass tort litigation. To restrict a federal court to the choice of law rules of
a state court system infrequently, if ever, called upon to make choice of
law decisions of such magnitude and complexity amounts to an inversion
problems are frequently cited as impediments to the use of these procedures. See, e.g., Causey v. Pan
Am. World Airways, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 392, 397 (E.D. Va. 1975) (class action inappropriate for mass
accident cases where plaintiffs reside in different jurisdictions).
For recognition that choice of law problems pose serious obstacles to collective adjudication, see
Rosenberg, supra note 40, at 907 n.222 ("difficult choice of law ...questions may restrict the
geographic and temporal scope of class actions and thus arbitrarily segregate class members"); Note,
Jurisdiction over Unnamed Plaintiffs in Multistate Class Actions, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 181, 207-08
(1985) ("adjudication in one forum of all claims arising out of the same occurrence may be inefficient
where choice-of-law problems arise"); Note, Class Certification in Mass Accident Cases, supra note
40, at 1146 ("joint litigation would be inappropriate if individual claims were governed by numerous,
widely varying state laws"); Note, Class Actions for Punitive Damages, supra note 40, at 1804
(choice of law questions may force court to "exclude from the class those claimants who cannot re-
cover punitive damages under applicable state law").
102. See Note, Class Certification in Mass Accident Cases, supra note 40, at 1144-46; see also
note 41 and accompanying text (discussing efficiency gains of collective adjudication).
103. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (differing liability standards as to defective instruc-
tional manuals); see also Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149, 171 n.95 (3d Cir. 1980) (discuss-
ing different standards of proof as to strict products liability between Ohio ("unreasonably danger-
ous") and Pennsylvania ("dangerous")), rev'd on other grounds, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). Compare
Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, 396 F. Supp. 95 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (airline not subject to liabil-
ity under Warsaw Convention for passenger injuries caused by terrorists), rev'd en banc, 550 F.2d
152 (3d Cir. 1977) with Day v. Trans World Airlines, 393 F. Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y.) (airline subject
to liability under Warsaw Convention to passengers injured in same attack involved in Evangelinos),
affd, 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976).
104. One of the prerequisites to a class action is a finding that the prosecution of separate actions
would create a risk of "inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A).
105. See Note, Class Certification in Mass Accident Cases, supra note 40, at 1145 nn.6-7 (dis-
cussing circumstances under which limited fund threatens adequacy of recovery).
1097
The Yale Law Journal
of the rationale and procedures that assign the bulk of mass tort litigation
to federal courts in the first place. Congress possesses the express author-
ity under the full faith and credit clause to prescribe laws determining the
extraterritorial effect to be given to state laws. In order to restore faith in
the judicial system's ability to manage mass tort claims, Congress should
use that power to enact a statute enabling and directing federal courts
presiding over multidistrict mass tort litigation to make choice of law deci-
sions consonant with the equity and efficiency principles of collective
adjudication.
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